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1 Introduction
A recent comprehensive review of structural issues related to corporate fi-
nance and economic activity for the Euro Area has pointed to the potential
impact of capital structure choices for the financial stability and economic
performance of the economy as a whole.1 In the present study, using a large
set of data, we investigate the determinants of funding choices of firms in
order to create a solid starting point for further research into access to fi-
nance and financial stability questions. In doing so, we take the view that
analyzing capital structure choice can inform macro- and micro-prudential
policies despite the fact that empirical evidence supports both main capital
structure theories (pecking order theory and trade-off theory). We find very
similar econometric results as in ECB (2013) as to which firm-specific factors
determine (i) the potential use of external funding by non-financial compa-
nies (NFCs) and (ii) its degree (leverage), but we extend the discussion by
analyzing the impact of additional industry- and country-specific factors.
A stylized fact that motivates our inquiry is the pronounced cross-country
variation in NFCs’ leverage ratios. Apparently different models of funding
structure are compatible with comparable levels of economic activity and
well-being. However, leverage ratios within an industry sector seem to fol-
low strong path dependence. At the end of the 1980s the bank-financed
German and Japanese models were considered the most sustainable, where
banks took important stakes in non-financial (manufacturing) industries and
thus had their incentives aligned with the long-term funding needs of re-
search and development intensive sectors. During the 1990s the Japanese
1See ECB (2013), page 13.
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model became infamous for its ”zombie” banks2 while Germany’s costly re-
unification created a structural break in the economic data for a number
of years. At present a new mantra of a well-diversified funding structure is
developed in light of the recent financial crisis. However, Germany and some
other European economies have done well with NFCs using mainly financ-
ing intermediated by banks rather than capital markets.3 In this context
we find it intriguing that among the two major theories that try to explain
NFCs’ capital structure choices, the pecking order theory seems to better
allow for country heterogeneity along the leverage dimension as compared
to the trade-off theory.
We build on Rajan and Zingales (1995) and subsequent empirical studies.
In addition to the firm-specific factors they have identified, we further inves-
tigate which other industry-specific and institutional factors affect capital
structure choices. Based on a short panel with a very large cross-section, we
can show that firm size, industry leverage, industry growth and tax shield
positively affect leverage ratios, while profitability and liquidity have neg-
ative impacts. Furthermore, tangibility has a positive impact on leverage
for those firms that use long-term debt financing. In addition, we find a
strong impact of international capital flows. The results are robust against
different panel estimators, decompositions and in yearly cross sections.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss previous literature
in the area. In Sections 3 we introduce the data and variables used in our
2A zombie bank is a financial institution with negative net worth. They continue to operate
as a result of government support that allow these banks to meet debt obligations and
avoid bankruptcy.
3Accordingly, Aoki and Nikolov (2012) identify this possibility of a stable bank-financed
economy and a possible increase in systemic risk as capital markets expand and diversify.
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empirical study. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. In Section 5 we
discuss the analytical results, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
The determinants of differences in capital structures have been the subject
of theoretical as well as empirical research over the past few decades.
2.1 Capital Structure Theories
Theoretical underpinnings go back to Modigliani and Miller (1958) who pro-
pose that the capital structure does not affect firm value in a tax-free, full-
information, no-agency world. However, given more realistic assumptions
about the market in which firms compete for external financing, theoretical
papers in the recent literature on capital structure suggested a vast number
of dynamics and intuitions.4 Two main theories prevail. First, the trade-off
theory by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) assumes that an optimal capital
structure exists for every firm at any point in time. It postulates that firms
trade off tax advantages from debt against refinancing risk where the opti-
mal debt-equity mix depends on tax and bankruptcy codes.
Second, the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) and My-
ers (1984) is based on information asymmetries between companies and in-
vestors. Here, firms do not have target leverage ratios but instead consider
capital costs and access to finance in order to determine their leverage. Given
increasing costs with rising information asymmetries, firms first make use
of internal funds such as retained earnings before acquiring debt and lastly,
4For an overview of capital structure choice theories including trade-off theory, pecking
order theory, market timing theory, cash flow theory and agency theory see Myers (1977,
2001), Goldstein et al. (2001), or Bhamra et al. (2010).
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new equity. Bertomeu et al. (2011) show that both a firm’s present capital
structure and its disclosure policy determine its capital costs.5
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Empirical assessments of capital structures have started with research into
firm characteristics by Rajan and Zingales (1995). In a cross-sectional study
of G7 countries they find four relevant firm level-drivers for leverage - firm
size, firm growth opportunities, tangibility and profitability. Moreover, they
show that inter-country differences are small. Faulkender and Petersen
(2006) and Brav (2009) add to that list two other important factors, age
and access to finance. The former examine US firms over two decades and
show that access to finance is positively related to leverage while the latter
analyzes UK firms over one decade to find that private firms are more lev-
ered and leverage restructuring is closer related to firm performance. One
intuition is that private equity is more costly than public equity due to in-
formation asymmetries.6
More recently, studies have also included industry drivers of leverage. Al-
mazan and Molina (2005), MacKay and Phillips (2005), Faulkender and
Petersen (2006), Brav (2009), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Degryse et al.
5A series of studies test the aforementioned two main capital structure theories. Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) specifically analyze projections
from both theories and find evidence in favor of a dynamic trade-off theory in line with
Goldstein et al. (2001) but most of the statistical tests employed have weak power.
6Bharath et al. (2009), Brav (2009), Huang and Ritter (2009) and Bharath and Dittmar
(2010) analyze the implications of information asymmetries on capital structure choice
and discuss the decision on security issuance in discrete choice models. For US and UK
firms, they find that larger information asymmetries drive leverage and that macroeco-
nomic conditions, market timing and the speed of adjustment towards target leverage
ratios are important in a firm’s decision to issue securities. De Jong et al. (2011) point
out that the pecking order theory better explains levels of debt while the trade-off theory
predicts debt issuance and repurchase decisions. In earlier work, Whited and Wu (2006)
build a structural model to construct an index for financial constraints of firms based on
how information asymmetries impact certain firm characteristics.
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(2012) find that inter- and intra-industry effects are important determi-
nants of individual leverage ratios for Dutch, UK and US firms.7 They
are able to show that the effects of firm characteristics on capital struc-
tures significantly differ across industries. Chen and Yu (2011) investigate
multinational corporations and find significant industry-fixed effects, export
intensity, and foreign direct investment which drive capital structure choice.
In their study on small Italian firms La Rocca et al. (2011) find that capital
structure choice also depends on a firm’s business life cycle and subsequently,
on growth patterns within industries. Including industry-specific factors in
the analysis can also serve as proxy for target leverage ratios and account
for correlated but omitted variables.
A third group of studies analyzes the effects of institutional and country
factors on capital structure choices. Antoniou et al. (2008), Psillaki and
Daskalakis (2009), Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan et al. (2012), O¨ztekin and
Flannery (2012) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) include a country’s legal and
financial traditions, inflation, GDP and capital flows in their analyses on
G5 countries, Southern Europe, 39 developing and developed countries, and
Turkey, respectively. They find that differences in capital structures re-
flect differences in the economic environment, specifically varying degrees of
exposure to capital markets, tax systems, institutions, macroeconomic con-
ditions and corporate governance practices. Whenever such country-specific
factors are common, firms determine their capital structure in similar ways.
Two caveats arise from previous empirical research with respect to capital
7Some of these studies make use of a very detailed level of data where they use factors
such as CEO tenure and compensation, and industry-specific risk hedging for which we
do not have data.
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structures. First, a series of papers shows that in order to thoroughly assess
time-series patterns in leverage ratios, a long time dimension (typically a
couple decades) in a dynamic panel model is needed and a common GMM
estimator is outperformed by a long-differencing estimator.8 However, this
very much restricts the longitudinal dimension of the data employed, to few
industries or few countries. Second, different results from empirical analyses
have often been attributed to sample selection bias.9 Most studies restrict
themselves to only a handful of countries or only a few industries. To our
knowledge, only recent papers have investigated and compared the impact of
industry and country characteristics.10 However, the industry composition
within countries as well as institutional factors vary a lot and can explain
the different findings.
Our contribution is thus twofold. First, we tackle the sample selection prob-
lem by analyzing a data set with a very large European cross-section, i.e.
in the number of firms, of industries and of countries, with respect to firm
size and the inclusion of USA and Japan as comparisons. Second, we aug-
ment the existing panel analyses with firm-, industry- and country-specific
variables that can explain more of the variation in the data on capital struc-
ture. Because we only have a short panel data set, we cannot analyze the
aforementioned dynamic aspect of capital structure choice, but we show that
for the short time period we analyze the data is stationary and our results
8Compare Antoniou et al. (2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), Denis and McKeon (2012),
and O¨ztekin and Flannery (2012).
9While Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Fan et al. (2012) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013)
support the trade-off theory, Brav (2009), La Rocca et al. (2011) and Degryse et al.
(2012) support the pecking order theory.
10Compare Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), Frank and Goyal (2009), Degryse et al. (2012),
Fan et al. (2012) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013). They are able to show that the importance
of capital structure determinants goes from firm-specific to country to industry-specific
effects. They show this with (i) the goodness-of-fit of their models and (ii) the size of
coefficients of the regressors in their models.
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are robust in yearly regressions. Our study provides strong indications that
corporate taxation needs to be part of macro-prudential policy for interna-
tional capital markets in view of the strong effects of national tax codes on
leverage ratios.
3 Data
This section explains the (i) data set as well as (ii) definitions and hypotheses
to be tested in our empirical analysis.
3.1 Sample
The data set measures capital structures in Europe, Japan and the USA
from 2003 until 2012. For firm-level data, we use the ORBIS database11
which contains company information for unlisted and listed companies. We
include firms with either revenue above EUR 1 million, assets above EUR
2 million, or more than 15 employees. Macroeconomic data comes from the
World Development Indicators of the World Bank. We identify different in-
dustries by using the two-digit industry codes of the European NACE Rev.
2 classification.12
We clean the data from coding errors and outliers, and perform some plau-
sibility checks. Any observations with missing data or implausible values
for variables (e.g. negative revenues) are dropped. We adjust the data to
keep only observations with leverage ratios in the interval [0,1], profitability
11The data were kindly provided by the European Commission under a license agreement
with Bureau van Dijk.
12We exclude firms with missing industry codes and firms operating in agriculture, mining,
financial services, public services, education, health, entertainment and other services
which constitute NACE Rev. 2 classification sections A, B, K, O, P, Q, R, S, T, and U.
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within [-1,1], tangibility and liquidity in [0,1].13 Firm growth is capped at
100%, i.e. a doubling of revenues from year to year. The final sample is an
unbalanced panel of 1,189,708 firms with 6,365,842 firm-year observations.
We do not have 10 years of data for all firms because each year some firms
enter or exit the sample.
3.2 Variables and Hypotheses
We use three different measures for the capital structure of firms in our anal-
ysis: short-term, long-term and total debt over total assets, respectively, de-
termined with book values.14 Rajan and Zingales (1995) demonstrate that
ratios of liabilities to assets are an appropriate measure widely adopted for
financial leverage of companies as they serve as a proxy for what is left for
shareholders in case of liquidation.15 On the other hand, the data set con-
sists of three different groups of independent variables: firm characteristics,
industry-specific parameters and country-specific variables.16
3.2.1 Firm-specific Factors
Firm Size One of the key determinants of leverage is firm size. Larger
firms are usually more established in their markets, diversified and less likely
to fail. Therefore, it has been argued that size can be seen as an inverse
13Section 3.2 provides definitions and shows why these are reasonable boundaries.
14In accordance with common nomenclature, short-term debt is any debt payable within
one year. Long-term debt is any liability exceeding one year in maturity.
15Subsequent studies have followed this approach while other definitions include market
values of equity or assets in the denominator (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999),
Welch (2004), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Antoniou et al. (2008), Frank and
Goyal (2009)) as a result of the critic against book measures being backward looking. In
addition, some studies have used interest coverage or debt maturity to measure leverage
of firms (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Welch (2004), Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan et al.
(2012)).
16See Table A1 in the Appendix for complete descriptions of the variables used here. All
financial data is in thousand EUR. Table A2 provides an overview of the distribution of
data along several dimensions.
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measure of bankruptcy risk. To avoid problems of multicollinearity we use
the logarithm of revenues to measure firm size since several of the ratios
used in our analyses are in terms of assets. Revenues and total assets are
highly correlated.17 The pecking order theory is ambiguous but the trade-off
theory postulates that leverage is positively affected by firm size as shown
in most of the empirical studies.
Firm Growth Future business prospects of a company represent an-
other important leverage factor (Rajan and Zingales (1995)). How firms
react to investment opportunities determines their profitability and status
in their respective markets. In order to mitigate problems of multicollinear-
ity we use growth rates in revenues to measure firm growth since several of
the ratios used in our analyses are in terms of assets.18 While the pecking
order theory predicts a positive relation to leverage, the trade-off theory
assumes a negative relation. Results from previous literature are mixed.19
Profitability More profitable firms usually generate more cash flows
and firms generally prefer to finance projects with internal funds. Since
retained earnings increase with higher profits, the need for debt financing
decreases with higher profitability.20 In line with Frank and Goyal (2009),
17While Rajan and Zingales (1995), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), and Ko¨ksal et al.
(2013) use revenues as a proxy for size, Frank and Goyal (2009), La Rocca et al. (2011),
Degryse et al. (2012) and Fan et al. (2012) use data on assets.
18Although Brav (2009), La Rocca et al. (2011) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) use percentage
changes in sales, Frank and Goyal (2009), Chen and Yu (2011) and Degryse et al. (2012)
use growth in terms of assets.
19Brav (2009) and Degryse et al. (2012) find a positive coefficient, while Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Fan et al. (2012) find a negative
coefficient in their respective analyses.
20Causality may vary, however, with younger firms or otherwise financially constrained
firms being required to achieve higher profitability in order to access external finance.
Still, informational asymmetries where firms have private knowledge about the true
value of their assets and firm growth opportunities could explain a wide range of cases.
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Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), and Chen and Yu (2011) we define profitabil-
ity as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets. While the
trade-off theory is ambiguous, the pecking order theory predicts a negative
relation as is the consensus in the literature.
Tangibility We define tangibility as the share of fixed assets to total
assets. The larger the fraction of fixed assets on a firm’s balance sheet, the
more assets it can pledge as collateral against debt which diminishes the
agency costs borne by the investor. Also, liquidation values ought to be
higher and easier to determine. Thus, it should be easier for a firm with
more tangible assets to acquire loans. Both capital structure theories pre-
dict a positive relation between tangibility and leverage.
Liquidity Firms with less liquidity may find it harder to attract debt as
costs of contract enforcement (including during possible insolvency proceed-
ings) increase. Numerous definitions exist. We use cash equivalents over
total assets as a proxy for firms’ capacity to demand payments from their
debtors while holding off on their creditors. Both theories are ambiguous
about the expected relation to leverage but Brav (2009) and Ko¨ksal et al.
(2013) have found a negative coefficient.
Nickell Criterion This factor comes from Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)
and measures financial stress of a company in terms of how much of its cash
flow is spent to cover debt expenses. Specifically, this flow measure allows
to capture the impact of interest rate changes on debt21.
21While this ratio is potentially interesting from a monetary policy and macro-prudential
point of view, it does not have explanatory power in our model.
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3.2.2 Industry-specific Factors
Industry Leverage In accordance with Frank and Goyal (2009), De-
gryse et al. (2012) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013), we measure industry trends
with median leverage ratios by grouping firms with the same two-digit in-
dustry classification codes. Early work by Harris and Raviv (1991) already
suggests a strong relationship between industry affiliation and leverage ratios
and highlights existing differences across industries but consistency within
them. The trade-off theory supposes that inter-industry effects exist as
the optimal leverage ratio may differ across industries. Also, the effects of
aforementioned firm characteristics may vary across industries. The peck-
ing order theory does not offer a clear prediction. Moreover, intra-industry
effects can arise from competition and agency conflicts within a market.
Firms may face higher pressure to assert to the optimal leverage ratio in
more competitive situations while increasing leverage might deter takeover
attempts or signal firm stability. Empirical evidence shows a strong positive
relation between industry and individual firm leverage.
Industry Growth To account for industry-specific demand shifts, we
also measure the development of an industry with median growth rates
across groups of firms with the same two-digit industry classification codes.
La Rocca et al. (2011) find a positive relationship with leverage ratios.
3.2.3 Macroeconomic Factors
Taxation We also measure the impact of a country’s fiscal treatment
of debt financing. Data on tax payments per firm comes from the ORBIS
database. Taxes affect the size of the tax shield for debt financing and they
can impact the amount of retained earnings and the dividend policy of a
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firm. These impacts tend to favor higher leverage ratios. Faulkender and
Petersen (2006), Degryse et al. (2012), Fan et al. (2012), Ko¨ksal et al.
(2013) and Feld et al. (2013) have shown that an effective debt interest tax
shield is positively related to leverage. The pecking order theory is ambiva-
lent about taxation, while the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation
between tax shield and leverage ratios. As a proxy for the tax shield per
country we compute the actual tax savings for firms with long-term debt
compared to firms without long-term debt.
Inflation Following Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan et al. (2012) and
Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) we include changes in consumer prices.22 Rising in-
flation decreases the relative value of debt. Also, tax deductions from debt
financing are more valuable when inflation is expected to be higher. Frank
and Goyal (2009) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) find a positive relation between
inflation and leverage which is in line with the trade-off theory.
GDP Growth The business cycle also has a profound impact on capital
structures. During times of economic prosperity collateral values increase
and debt financing becomes easier. Agency problems between firms and in-
vestors become more severe in economic downturns. However, internal funds
of firms generally increase in economic expansion so that according to the
pecking order theory firms might make less use of debt financing. Whited
and Wu (2006) find that financially constrained firms’ cost of financing di-
minishes with the duration of the economic upswing. Thus, leverage could
be either pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Frank and Goyal (2009) find a
positive relation while Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) find a negative one.
22Data for this factor and subsequent macroeconomic factors comes from the World De-
velopment Indicators, World Bank.
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Capital Flows Antoniou et al. (2008), Fan et al. (2012) and Ko¨ksal
et al. (2013) argue that developments in capital markets are important
to determine firm-level capital structures. Hereby, the size and structure
of national capital markets depends heavily on the international allocation
and dispersion of capital. Thus, we include a measure for capital flows in
our analysis. This takes on positive values whenever money is flowing into a
country, effectively representing an increase of foreign ownership of domestic
assets. The factor is negative whenever money is flowing out of the country
suggesting that a country increases its ownership of foreign assets. Anto-
niou et al. (2008) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) find a positive relation between
capital flows and leverage.
Unemployment As another business cycle indicator and to account
for developments in labor markets, we include the fraction of work force
that is unemployed by drawing from World Bank accounts.
Stock Prices We also want to take into consideration how expensive eq-
uity for public firms is. Thus, we include data on Standard & Poor’s Global
Equity Indices collected by the World Bank which measure the performance
of various stock exchanges around the world. Welch (2004), Antoniou et
al. (2008) and Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that the effect of changing
stock prices on capital structure may reflect overall growth prospects, rela-
tive price changes in asset classes or differences in agency costs. Firms may
take advantage of mispricing in stock markets to reduce their capital costs.
Thus, capital structure theories predict and empirical analyses confirm that
stock price development and leverage ratios are negatively related.
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4 Empirical Analysis
This section explores the determinants of capital structures of NFCs empir-
ically. We first provide (i) a description of the data and then (ii) present the
empirical model specification.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Properties
Observations are evenly distributed over the time period investigated here.
About two thirds of the companies in our sample have between five to eight
observations while 25% of firms have eight or more consecutive observations.
Some countries like France, Italy and Spain have a large number of data
points while we cautiously also include countries with few observations in
our sample, like Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Montenegro and Malta.
Figure 1 shows the three leverage ratios and their behavior over time. Weak
time trends are visible. Long-term leverage seems to increase continuously,
while short-term leverage seems to decrease over our sample period which
covers after all a full business cycle from trough to trough.
Figure 1: Leverage Ratios over Time
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Table 1a provides an overview of the summary statistics of the variables in-
troduced in Section 3.2. It shows that there exists great heterogeneity among
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firms in terms of size, growth and profitability as well as large differences
across industries and countries. Generally, variances of our variables are
quite large. Industry- and country-specific factors are less volatile. Across
the sample, firms hold on average 65% debt in terms of total assets. Notably,
we find that 40% of the firms in our sample do not hold any long-term debt
and subsequently, short-term debt accounts for approximately 84% of total
debt. For most variables, mean and median are close, except for firm-level
growth and liquidity where we have only a few high-growth companies and
only a few firms with large cash reserves.
Table 1a: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
St LR 0.545 0.561 0.267 0 1
Lt LR 0.105 0.005 0.181 0 1
Total LR 0.650 0.696 0.249 0 1
Firm Size 7.824 7.681 1.808 0 20.457
Firm Growth 0.393 0.058 3.048 -1 100
Profitability 0.080 0.056 0.127 -1 1
Tangibility 0.329 0.249 0.282 0 1
Liquidity 0.127 0.059 0.164 0 1
Nickell 0.293 0.059 43.068 -18505 83094
St Ind. LR 0.548 0.579 0.108 0.164 0.745
Lt Ind. LR 0.020 0.006 0.029 0 0.325
Total Ind. LR 0.693 0.694 0.053 0.381 0.821
Ind. Growth 0.058 0.065 0.057 -0.288 0.244
Tax Shield 0.005 0.005 0.005 0 0.063
Inflation 2.807 2.166 2.789 -4.480 25.296
GDP Growth 1.359 1.725 3.089 -17.955 12.233
Capital Flows 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.020 0.042
Unemployment 8.806 8.400 3.479 2.300 37.300
Stock Prices 9.072 13.076 35.392 -82.190 189.230
Notes: N=6,365,842. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions
of the variables. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms.
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We can also compare leverage measures, our explanatory variables as well
as balance sheet data and items from the profit-and-loss statement (P&L)
across countries. Table 1b depicts the differences for eight major countries in
our sample. We find substantial variation in overall capital structure choice,
e.g. Italy versus the USA, and in debt maturity, where e.g. Italy and Poland
have very small shares of long-term debt to total debt. For our explanatory
variables, differences are substantial across countries. While large firms are
located in Japan and the USA, Southern European firms have the highest
growth rates.
Table 1b: Cross-country Comparison of Variables
Germany UK France Italy Spain Poland USA Japan
Leverage Measures
Total LR 0.683 0.605 0.638 0.752 0.608 0.538 0.468 0.542
Long LR 0.241 0.115 0.057 0.077 0.165 0.071 0.142 0.115
Short LR 0.441 0.489 0.582 0.675 0.442 0.468 0.325 0.428
Explanatory Variables
Firm Size 9.534 9.621 7.914 7.609 7.478 8.582 11.534 12.209
Firm Growth 0.242 0.191 0.207 0.442 0.485 0.289 0.418 0.078
Profitability 0.099 0.080 0.095 0.057 0.062 0.108 -0.007 0.046
Tangibility 0.337 0.358 0.253 0.297 0.365 0.409 0.471 0.441
Liquidity 0.115 0.123 0.190 0.080 0.124 0.108 0.222 0.179
Nickell 1.123 0.386 0.039 0.467 0.314 0.093 0.129 -0.239
Total Ind LR 0.680 0.683 0.696 0.693 0.703 0.684 0.639 0.669
Long Ind LR 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.024 0.021 0.020 0.012 0.014
Short Ind LR 0.538 0.541 0.572 0.534 0.547 0.542 0.516 0.543
Ind Growth 0.058 0.061 0.060 0.054 0.059 0.055 0.068 0.066
Tax Shield 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.009
Inflation 1.583 2.638 1.725 2.093 2.740 2.983 2.508 -0.127
GDP Growth 1.331 1.349 1.124 0.100 1.661 4.504 1.594 0.821
Capital Flows -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.001 -0.001
Unemployment 8.481 6.093 8.716 7.576 13.158 11.738 6.615 4.523
Stock Prices 12.191 6.399 5.617 -1.458 11.807 11.465 5.969 6.775
Balance Sheet Items
Cash Equiv 8068.503 11702.990 2047.225 946.198 1256.842 1508.315 218442.600 168741.100
Fixed Assets 60300.030 96672.770 12213.010 8161.040 9431.051 11214.540 1473932.000 875690.600
Total Assets 109880.300 216787.300 21981.900 16159.260 16731.570 18411.120 2179010.000 1543776.000
Short-term Debt 54035.410 126398.900 11882.790 8756.929 6814.443 7626.083 843778.800 681131.500
Long-term Debt 22638.130 35025.690 3285.930 2507.065 4303.499 1741.117 479997.300 301391.200
Shareholders Equity 33206.710 55362.690 6813.181 4895.263 5613.629 9043.921 855233.800 561253.500
P&L Items
Revenue 142291.500 145428.500 20566.370 12709.050 12576.800 22002.590 1937623.000 1365154.000
EBITDA 108796.740 14736.450 2014.106 1550.000 1468.947 2270.105 295891.000 146243.300
EBIT 6157.123 9343.033 1233.255 700.344 944.808 1377.137 199215.600 75171.620
Interest 1370.790 6.085 198.418 169.235 131.706 143.710 23221.590 9429.621
Tax Payments 1600.950 2445.634 295.732 258.056 208.171 237.148 56685.990 28232.310
Net Income 3043.198 6891.314 739.105 273.053 605.034 996.280 119308.000 37509.690
Notes: Mean Values per Country. See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Factors used in regression
analyses are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. Balance sheet and P&L items are in thousand EUR.
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Profitability is generally low.23 Tangibility and liquidity are highest for US
firms while industry-specific factors are similar. Macroeconomic conditions
differ as well, naturally. The composition of firms’ balance sheets and P&L
statements shows that considerable differences in levels exist. We also find
that large firms from Japan and the USA are overrepresented in our sample
as country-average levels of balance sheet items vastly exceed those of Eu-
ropean firms. This may also explain the significantly lower leverage ratios
for US and Japanese firms in the data set.
A decomposition of Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) four main drivers of lever-
age reveals great differences across industries and countries.24 Large firms
exist predominantly in Russia, USA, Japan and Switzerland, while most
small firms exist in Southern and Eastern Europe. Large firms are mainly
operating in the industry clusters electricity, gas and water supply as well
as manufacturing. Firms with high growth rates are located in Eastern
Europe and active in electricity, gas and water supply as well as ICT and
research. The most profitable firms exist in Northern Europe and respec-
tively, in industry clusters ICT and research and services. Most firms show
low profitability. About 98% of observations lie within the interval [-0.5,0.5]
and about 83% of the data points are within one standard deviation away
from the overall mean (0.08). Finally, firms with the largest share of fixed
assets are located in Switzerland, Cyprus and Denmark and are active in
accommodation and food as well as electricity, gas and water supply.
23For the USA, some firms experience significant losses over our sample period which
explains the negative average profitability, but the median of profitability for US firms
in our sample is 0.057.
24For brevity we relegate these Figures A1a, A1b, A2a, A2b, A3a, A3b, A4a and A4b to
the Appendix.
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Notably, the tax shield differs significantly among countries as depicted in
Figure 2 with Iceland, the Netherlands and Russia providing the highest tax
incentives for debt financing.25 Because we compute both the tax shield and
the firm-specific factors relative to total assets, we can compare level effects
of our variables. Remarkably, the level of most tax shields is much smaller
than those of the firm-specific factors. While e.g. profitability, tangibility
and liqudity have means 0.080, 0.329 and 0.127, respectively, tax shield has
a mean value of 0.005 as indicated in Table 1a. Hence, already small changes
in the tax shield can have big impacts on firms’ funding structure.
Figure 2: Tax Shield across Countries
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
Ta
x 
Sh
ie
ld
 p
er
 C
ou
nt
ry
AT BA BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES F
I
FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT JP L
I LT LU LV MC ME MK NL NO PL PT RO RS RU SE S
I SK TR UA US
Data for Malta is excluded.
Following the descriptives, a variety of univariate analyses provide a first
glance at the variables’ behavior and properties. Our explanatory variables
are all correlated with the leverage ratios.26 A F-test confirms joint sig-
nificance. Furthermore, firm characteristics are correlated with each other
and over time. We have carefully selected and computed our explanatory
indicators with relatively low correlations from the vast group of available
variables in the ORBIS database to avoid problems of multicollinearity. We
25We exclude Malta from this figure because it has only 221 observations and is considered
as a tax haven within the EU. Hence, its average tax savings per firm is far above that
from other countries.
26See Tables A3a and A3b in the Appendix.
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find weak time trends given the data is stationary as indicated in unit root
tests. Mann-Whitney U tests and t-tests show that the mean and vari-
ance of leverage ratios are significantly different across countries and indus-
tries. European firms hold more debt and in particular, firms located in
the Euro Area. Investigating capital structure choice across industries, es-
pecially firms in trade and transportation have significantly different debt
holdings from firms pursuing other economic activities. A robust version
of the Wu-Hausman test by Wooldridge (2002) shows that fixed effects
modeling is preferred over a random effects setup. Furthermore, Breusch-
Pagan, Jarque-Bera and Breusch-Godfrey tests respectively show that the
error terms are heteroskedastic, asymptotically normal and correlated with
each other within panels.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
We regress firms’ leverage ratios on firm characteristics and other controls
following the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1995) who have identified four
relevant factors for leverage (firm size, firm growth, profitability, tangibility)
and that of related empirical studies such as Faulkender and Petersen (2006),
Brav (2009), Frank and Goyal (2009), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), De-
gryse et al. (2012), Fan et al. (2012) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013). They analyze
similar questions and provide valid frameworks to assess capital structure
choices.
Subsequently, we test the predictions of the pecking order vs. trade-off
theory with a series of fixed effects panel regressions. Because of the data
properties presented above, our baseline model specification is as follows.
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Li,t = αz + βXi,t−1 + γYs,t−1 + ρZk,t−1 + δt + i,t (1)
where indices i, s, k represent firms, industries and countries, respectively,
and t stands for time. L is the leverage ratio per firm and period. We
use here three measures that accordingly reflect short-term, long-term and
total debt over total assets. X is the vector of firm characteristics while
Y is the vector of industry-specific factors and Z is the vector of country
factors. To reduce problems with endogeneity and to include all factors in
the information set, we lag our independent variables by one time period.
To account for firm heterogeneity and partial skewness in the data of some
factors, we use only ratios or logarithms of our variables. The regression
model also includes αz with z = {i, s, k} and δt to account for omitted firm-,
industry- and country-specific effects and year fixed effects, respectively. As
suggested by Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of our
robust error term  at firm-level and year-level. The asymptotically normal
robust standard errors then account for heteroskedasticity and within-panel
serial correlation.
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5 Results
In this section we discuss the main results and perform a number of ro-
bustness checks. We also investigate subsamples and different industry and
country charateristics.
5.1 Full Sample
In a first step, we assess the validity of our model specification to account
for the data properties presented in Section 4.1. To do so, we compare the
panel model set up in Section 4.2 with the three different leverage ratios.
Table 2 provides the overview for that. In all regressions we include firm and
year fixed effects as well as a constant but suppress their coefficients in the
tables. In column 1 of Table 2 we analyze total leverage ratios, in column
2 we look at long-term leverage ratios and in column 3 we apply short-term
leverage ratios as the dependent variable.27 In separate analyses we employ
industry and country fixed effects and find that the results do not change.
We also run the regressions with the entire sample and with differences of
firm leverage from industry median leverage as dependent variables and find
qualitatively same results.28
For total leverage ratios we discover positive impacts on leverage from firm
size, industry leverage, industry growth and tax shield, while profitability
and liquidity have negative impacts. Industry-specific factors and capital
flows turn negative for long-term leverage ratios. It seems that the business
cycle affects long-term capital structure choice differently. On the other
hand, tax shield turns negative for short-term leverage ratios, but we have
27In column 2 we only include firms that have long-term debt > 0 and in column 3 we
only include firms that have short-term debt > 0.
28For brevity, we relegate these regressions to Tables A4, A5 and A6 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Baseline Results for Three Leverage Ratios
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Total Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.159*** -0.062*** -0.128***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.028*** 0.103*** -0.103***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.080*** -0.003** -0.075***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.144***
(0.008)
Lt Ind. LR -0.094***
(0.013)
St Ind. LR 0.158***
(0.007)
Ind. Growth 0.008*** -0.025*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.097*** 1.504*** -0.421***
(0.020) (0.088) (0.025)
Inflation 0.001*** -0.000 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.226*** -0.209*** 0.465***
(0.033) (0.044) (0.039)
Unemployment -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 1,794,355 3,263,935
Number of firms 887,514 596,868 887,197
R-squared 0.099 0.136 0.204
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and
taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from
the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. In all regressions,
I include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in
the tables. Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust
standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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had no prediction for that relation here since the tax shield is zero for all
firms with short-term debt only, and it only applies to firms with long-term
debt. The variables firm size, profitability and liquidity provide consistent
results across the three different leverage ratios.
In contrast to capital structure theories and most empirical studies, we also
find a negative impact of tangibility on total and short-term leverage ratios.
We would argue that this comes from the composition of our data set, namely
the large majority of small firms.29 The dominance of short-term debt in
our data may reflect that especially small firms use only short-term debt in-
struments and that asset specificity makes it harder for firms to obtain cash
against fixed assets. We hence argue that the trade-off between liquidity
and fixed assets as well as the fact that cash equivalents cover short-term
debt financing more adequately and reliably in the eyes of investors leads
to the negative beta coefficient for tangibility for total leverage ratios.30 For
long-term leverage ratios, we find the expected positive coefficient. This is
obvious as firms holding long-term debt use fixed assets as collateral against
their long-term external financing.31
Surprisingly, financial stress, individual and country-specific growth poten-
tial as well as stock market developments do not play a role in capital struc-
ture choice. The coefficients for the Nickell criterion are not significant and
29Remember that about 40% of the firms in our sample do not hold any long-term debt and
that short-term debt constitutes most of total liabilities held by firms. Firms that hold
short-term debt only do not make use of capital markets, but rather employ overdraft
and cash facilities for their external financing. Hence, tangibility is negatively correlated
with size, growth, profitability, liquidity and positive related to country-level factors in
our sample.
30As a robustness check, we also run a regression with an interaction term between firm
size and tangibility and find the expected positive and significant coeffient. That is, a
larger size allows firms to pledge more fixed assets as collateral against debt financing.
31Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) find the same dynamics.
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the coefficients for firm-level and country-level growth as well as for Standard
& Poor’s Global Equity Indices are significant but economically not relevant.
In summary, we find that firm size, industry leverage, industry growth and
tax shield positively affect leverage ratios, while profitability and liquidity
have negative impacts. Our results are quite robust. We compare our re-
gression model to different specifications with an estimator incorporating
panel-specific AR(1)-disturbances, the Newey-West heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator as well as the Driscoll-Kraay
(1998) estimator accounting for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and spa-
tial correlation and find similar results in terms of signs of coefficients and
significance.32 Our results also do not change for piecewise exclusion of data
from USA, Japan, Norway and Switzerland.33
Year-by-year regressions show that the size of coefficients changes, but not
the signs or significance, except for industry growth (changing signs) and
capital flows for which the sign of the ρ coefficient turns negative in 2007,
more so in 2009 and 2010. This reflects the reversal in international capital
flows during this period. Tax shield coefficients become larger over time.34
With our definition of tax shield as a share of total assets, we also capture
valuation effects in balance sheets of firms. Overall, the yearly regressions
indicate that our model is quite robust over time.
32We also run dynamic panel models and find qualitatively similar results in terms of
significance and signs of coefficients although the goodness-of-fit of theses models is
worse given that we work with a short panel with small T and very large N.
33These countries exhibit particular structural differences to the majority of the countries
in our sample, e.g. a large group of MNEs in the US, the Japanese loose monetary
policy, a large sovereign wealth fund owned by the Kingdom of Norway, or the large
Swiss financial industry. Our results are not driven by influences of these particularities.
34This growing tax distortion merits future research in our view given the possible impli-
cations for macro-prudential policies.
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We can compare our results to the capital structure theories and previ-
ous empirical studies on that matter. This is depicted in Table 3. We find
similarities especially with Frank and Goyal (2009), Psillaki and Daskalakis
(2009) and Ko¨ksal et al. (2013). Moreover, our model is an improvement
over Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) four-factor core model and subsequent speci-
fications from other empirical studies in terms of explaining data variation.35
We would argue that our findings, which are based on a much larger cross-
section and on a much larger scale in terms of firm characteristics, ought to
be more representative of the capital structure choices the average firm in a
developed country makes.
35For brevity, we relegate the comparison of the different empirical capital structure models
to Table A7 in the Appendix. We include in Table A7 only major changes between model
specifications.
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5.2 Industry Analysis
Furthermore, we check the robustness of our results for industry dynamics
by analysing industry sectors separately. In accordance with ECB (2013),
we cluster the two-digit industry codes of the European NACE Rev. 2 clas-
sification by their respective economic activity to nine different groups.36
We then want to disentangle different industry dynamics by analyzing capi-
tal structure choice according to economic activity. Figures 3a and 3b show
cross-sectional and time-series behavior of capital structures across industry
clusters.
Figure 3a: Leverage Ratios across Industries
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We find trade and transportation sectors with the highest leverage ratios on
average, while electricity, gas and water supply use the least amount of debt.
Over time, there is strong persistence in the capital structure choice within
36”Manufacturing” encompasses all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification section C,
”Electricity, gas and water supply” includes all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification
sections D and E, ”Construction and real estate” groups all firms from NACE Rev. 2
classification sections F and L, ”Wholesale trade” encompasses those firms from NACE
Rev. 2 classification section G with two-digit industry codes 45 and 46, ”Retail trade”
includes those firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification section G with two-digit industry
code 47, ”Transportation and storage” groups all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification
section H, ”Accommodation and food” encompasses all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classi-
fication section I, ”ICT and research” includes all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification
section J and those from section M with two-digit industry code 72, and finally, ”Pro-
fessional and administrative services” groups all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification
sections M and N except those with two-digit industry code 72.
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an industry, except for firms active in electricity, gas and water supply for
which average total leverage ratios sharply increase over our sample period.
Figure 3b: Leverage Ratios across Industries and Time
Table 4 provides the results of our model specification presented in Section
4.2 with the sample decomposed into the nine different industry segments.
Here, we leave out industry median leverage in the regressions because this
is just a level effect in an inter-industry analysis. We also run regressions
with deviations of firm leverage from industry median leverage as depen-
dent variables and find qualitatively same results.37 The variables firm size,
firm growth, profitability, liquidity, tax shield, inflation and unemployment
provide consistent results across the nine different industery groups. While
firm size, firm-level growth, tax shield and inflation have positive impacts
on leverage ratios, profitability, liquidity and unemployment have negative
impacts. Coefficients for capital flows are positive except for retail trade.
Tangibility decreases leverage except for the two sectors retail trade and
transportation. Considerable differences in capital structure choice across
industries then arise from varying demand in markets and from different
levels in the relevant explanatory variables.
37For brevity, we relegate these regressions to Table A8 in the Appendix.
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5.3 Geographic Analysis
We also analyze whether location is an important parameter that affects
the way our explanatory variables cause capital structure choice and that
accounts for any unobserved effects given geographic characteristics.
5.3.1 Regions
First, we investigate broad geo-political aspects. To do so, we compare
firms located in the European Union38 and within the Euro Area39 to a
control group. We define this control group as all EFTA states and the two
non-European countries in our sample. Thus, this group includes Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Japan and the USA.
Initially, we find that mean and variance of leverage ratios when clustered
into the aforementioned three groups are significantly different. Firms in
the Euro Area have on average higher leverage ratios than firms located in
the European Union and more so, than firms in the control group. Table
5 depicts the regression results for the three groups. Higher leverage ra-
tios in the European Union and Euro Area are driven by taxation effects
and capital flows. Tangibility and unemployment positively affect debt fi-
nancing of firms in our control group, while the coefficients remain negative
for the other two groups. All other factors have similar effects on capital
structure choice of firms. Differences between firms located in the European
Union and those in the Euro Area are predominately driven by effects from
38We only have 27 countries for the European Union instead of 28 because Croatia acquired
membership on July 1, 2013, but our data set ends in 2012.
39We exclude Latvia from the Euro Area because it adopted the currency on January
1, 2014 but our data set ends in 2012. However, we include Monaco and Montenegro
because the former shares a monetary union with France and the latter is an unilateral
adopter of the Euro.
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the internal capital market. Firms outside the Euro Area experience ex-
change rate risks and face tougher lending and reserve requirements, while
the common supranational monetary policy within the Euro Area insures
against illiquidity and country-specific risks.
Table 5: Results for Total Leverage Ratio across Regions
Control Group§ EU27† Euro Area‡
Variables Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.096*** -0.173*** -0.179***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangiblity 0.026*** -0.026*** -0.032***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.059*** -0.081*** -0.083***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.159*** 0.091*** 0.066***
(0.021) (0.008) (0.009)
Ind. Growth 0.067*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shielda 0.693*** 1.098*** 1.066***
(0.065) (0.021) (0.022)
Inflation 0.001 0.001*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth -0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows -9.900*** 0.126*** 1.151***
(1.117) (0.034) (0.050)
Unemployment 0.012*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 197,398 2,959,093 2,547,956
Number of firms 46,064 809,574 674,827
R-squared 0.079 0.108 0.113
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level
data and taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic
factors comes from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates
or logarithms. In all regressions, I include firm and year fixed effects and a
constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. § includes EFTA states
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland), USA and Japan. † excludes
Croatia. ‡ includes Monaco and Montenegro, excludes Latvia. Following
Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard
errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.3.2 Countries
Second, we disclose the importance of macroeconomic conditions by analyz-
ing cross-country differences in leverage ratios. This heterogeneity is more
profound than among industries. Figures 4a and 4b show cross-sectional
and time-series behavior of capital structures across countries.40
Figure 4a: Leverage Ratios across Countries
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Figure 4b: Leverage Ratios across Countries and Time
40We have firm-level data from 42 different countries. Tables and Figures make use of
the ISO 3166-1 two-digit country codes. These are: AT = Austria, BA = Bosnia and
Herzegovina, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CH = Switzerland, CY = Cyprus, CZ =
Czech Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, ES = Spain, FI =
Finland, FR = France, GB = United Kingdom, GR = Greece, HR = Croatia, HU =
Hungary, IE = Ireland, IS = Iceland, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, LI = Liechtenstein, LT
= Lithuania, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, MC = Monaco, ME = Montenegro, MK
= Macedonia, MT = Malta, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, PT =
Portugal, RO = Romania, RS = Serbia, RU = Russia, SE = Sweden, SI = Slovenia, SK
= Slovakia, TR = Turkey, UA = Ukraine, US = USA.
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Among the countries with the highest average leverage ratios, we find Ger-
many, Italy, Monaco and Norway, while firms with the least amounts of
debt per firm are located in Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey,
Ukraine and the USA. Over time, cross-country differences also vary con-
siderably. While most average leverage ratios per countries run in a band
between 40 to 80%, yearly differences are significant which do not suggest a
strong path dependence.
Table 6 then provides an overview of the results from our country-by-country
regressions.41 We include the three countries with the highest average lever-
age ratios, namely, Germany, Italy and Norway, as well as the three countries
with the lowest average leverage ratios, being Turkey, Ukraine and the USA.
In particular, the results suggest that cross-country differences are mainly
driven by differences in industry structure and composition within a country.
Firm size has a significant positive impact on leverage ratios for high-leverage
countries while it has no effect in low-leverage countries. Profitability and
liquidity are consistently negatively related to leverage ratios, while tangi-
bility decreases leverage ratios except in Germany and Norway. The degree
of tangibility affects country-specific capital structures through the sectoral
distribution of economic activity which percisely has such a large degree.
Coefficients for industry median leverage are positive except for firms in
Italy whereas tax shields consistenly drive debt financing in all countries.
Results for firm-level and industry growth, GDP growth, the Nickell crite-
rion, unemployment and stock prices are inconclusive.
41We exclude Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Monaco and Montenegro from the cross-country
study due to lack of observations.
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We also run regressions for the eight major countries that we previously
investigated in Table 1b. Profitability and liquidity consistently negatively
affect capital structures, while tax shields regularly drive leverage ratios
positively. Coefficients for tangibility are positive except for Italy, Japan
and the USA. Results are inconclusive for firm size and firm-level growth,
the Nickell criterion, industry-specific factors, and business cycle indicators.
5.4 Firm Characteristics
Finally, we explore in more detail how different firm characteristics impact
the effects of our explanatory variables on capital structure choice. That is,
we make refinements to our subsampling in order to capture (i) the impact
of information asymmetries between investors and firms through dissecting
firms according to their legal status and (ii) how well our model explains
the respective capital structure choices of firms of different size. This may
indicate whether a firm’s position in the life cycle or industry benchmarks
have an effect on capital structure choice because large firms tend to be
well-established industry leaders.
5.4.1 Public vs. Private Firms
We investigate information asymmetries by subsampling our data set into
two groups, publicly traded companies and private firms, respectively.42 Pri-
vate firms should encounter greater difficulties in acquiring external financ-
ing and in particular, debt, as potential investors incur higher agency costs
and the problem of adverse selection is bigger. Not surprisingly, mean and
variance of leverage ratios between both groups are significantly different.
We find that private firms have higher leverage ratios on average than public
42For 162,250 firms with 864,026 firm-year observations, the legal status could not be
accurately identified so they are not included in either group.
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firms. This may stem from the fact that private firms do not have access to
many equity or equity-like financial instruments that publicly traded com-
panies may make use of.
The majority of public firms in our sample is located in France, Greece,
Italy and Spain, while Finland, Iceland, Ireland and Spain have the highest
share of public companies to total amount of firms in the sample. Most
countries have a large share of private firms.
Table 7 provides the overview of our model for the subsamples into public
and private firms. Results for both groups are the same as in the baseline
model in Table 2 for firm-level and macroeonomic factors, except for capital
flows which are positively related to debt financing for public firms only.
Also, public firms experience larger effects from industry-specific factors on
their leverage ratios. This indicates that public firms adhere more to mar-
ket pressures in setting leverage targets due to increased transparency and
visibility of their business operations. On the other hand, private firms have
financing models that are less affected in their capital structure choice by
changes in international capital flows. This may arise from the fact that
foreign ownership disproportionally increases in publicly traded companies
due to better capital market liquidity.
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Table 7: Results for Total Leverage Ratio due to Firms’ Legal Status
public firms private firms
Variables Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.009*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.183*** -0.155***
(0.004) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.045*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.095*** -0.075***
(0.003) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.230*** 0.064***
(0.018) (0.009)
Ind. Growth 0.011*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.771*** 1.009***
(0.057) (0.024)
Inflation 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.929*** -0.033
(0.062) (0.042)
Unemployment -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y
Constant Y Y
Observations 533,609 2,280,129
Number of newid 135,724 634,245
R-squared 0.166 0.115
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the
variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the
ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes
from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth
rates or logarithms. In all regressions, I include firm and
year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their co-
efficients in the tables. Following Petersen (2009), we
employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard er-
rors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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5.4.2 Small vs. Large Firms
Another inquiry with respect to information asymmetries, transactions costs
and the range of available funding instruments analyzes the effect of firm
size on capital structure choice. To do so, we divide our sample in deciles
and investigate the lowest and highest groups, namely, the 10% firms in our
data set with the smallest firm size and the 10% with the largest firm size.
Mean and variance of leverage ratios for small firms are significantly lower
than otherwise. On the other hand, average leverage for large firms is close
to that of the overall sample. The smallest firms in our data set are located
in Italy, Spain and the Ukraine, while the largest firms are located in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom.
Table 8 provides the results for both deciles. For most of the explanatory
variables, the effects on capital structure choice are the same in both deciles
and as in Table 2. Firm size obviously affects only large firms. Industry-
specific factors drive down debt financing only for small firms, while it is
positively related for large companies. Macroeconomic factors affect large
firms to a lesser degree. Overall, it seems that large firms are bound by
higher market pressure in concentrated segments within their respective eco-
nomic activity and benefit overly from industry trends and demand. On the
other hand, small firms are more affected by changes in foreign ownership
of domestic assets than large firms.
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Table 8: Results for Total Leverage Ratio according to Firm Size
small firms large firms
Variables Total Leverage Total Leverage
Size -0.001 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm Growth 0.000** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.085*** -0.180***
(0.006) (0.004)
Tangibility -0.066*** -0.013***
(0.005) (0.004)
Liquidity -0.069*** -0.067***
(0.007) (0.004)
Nickell 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR -0.051* 0.277***
(0.029) (0.019)
Ind. Growth -0.067*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.004)
Tax Shield 1.821*** 1.020***
(0.141) (0.061)
Inflation 0.004*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 2.192*** 0.505***
(0.208) (0.111)
Unemployment 0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y
Constant Y Y
Observations 230,489 358,206
Number of firms 109,319 103,892
R-squared 0.035 0.108
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the
variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the
ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes
from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth
rates or logarithms. In all regressions, I include firm and
year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their co-
efficients in the tables. Following Petersen (2009), we
employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard er-
rors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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6 Conclusion
Capital structure choice is a highly relevant topic for a firm’s prosperity and
to deduce the right economic and competition policies, especially given the
economic development and turmoil over the last decade. Both theoretical
and empirical literature has dealt with a number of mechanisms and factors
that firms consider and encounter in their financing decisions. In this paper,
we follow similar empirical research in conducting a series of panel analy-
ses to determine the most important factors that drive leverage ratios. We
append previous work in drawing on a variety of different parameters and
indices on firm-, industry- and country-level to explain a greater portion of
variation in the data.
We base our analysis on a large cross-sectional data set to mitigate problems
of selection and survival biases. Then, we expand empirical frameworks by
Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan et al. (2012), Ko¨ksal et al. (2013) and the
ECB (2013) to quantitatively assess capital structure choices over the past
decade with an emphasis on Europe. We show that firm size, industry lever-
age, industry growth and tax shield positively affect leverage ratios, while
profitability and liquidity have negative impacts. Furthermore, tangibility
has a positive impact on leverage for those firms that use long-term debt
financing. For small firms that mostly make use of short-term debt only,
we find a negative relationship due to the trade-off between tangibility and
liquidity to serve debt obligations to investors. In addition, we find a strong
impact of international capital allocation due to the size of coefficients for
our capital flows variable. The results are robust against different panel
estimators, decompositions and in yearly cross sections.
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Our study makes a deliberate choice in favor of a highly representative sam-
ple with a very large cross-section while a majority of empirical studies has
previously used much smaller samples of larger (listed) firms. Hence, an
important contribution of our paper is to provide a check to what extent
previous results may have suffered from a small sample bias, or rather from a
selection bias that ignored financial constraints of the vast majority of NFCs.
Indeed, we find that previous studies neglected the different capital struc-
ture choice of small firms, cross-country differences as well as the effects of
the business cycle and the size of national capital markets on leverage. This
explains differences in empirical results. Second, our study provides strong
indications that corporate taxation needs to be part of macro-prudential
policy frameworks in view of the important effects of national tax codes on
leverage ratios. Furthermore, our very representative estimates can be seen
as an input for future research on the quantification of international intra-
group capital mobility and tax-base shifting.
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Appendix
Table A1: Overview of Variables, Definitions and Sources
Variables Definitions Sources43
Leverage Ratios
Short-term Leverage short-term debt / total assets ORBIS
Long-term Leverage long-term debt / total assets ORBIS
Total Leverage (long-term debt + short-term
debt) / total assets
ORBIS
Firm-specific Factors
Firm Size logarithm of revenues ORBIS
Firm Growth percentage change in revenues ORBIS
Profitability EBIT / total assets ORBIS
Tangibility fixed assets / total assets ORBIS
Liquidity cash equivalents / total assets ORBIS
Nickell Criterion interest paid / cash flow computed from
ORBIS data
Industry-specific Factors
Industry Leverage median of (short-term, long-
term, total) leverage per year
and industry
computed from
ORBIS data
Industry Growth median percentage change in
revenues per year and industry
computed from
ORBIS data
Macroeconomic Factors
Tax Shield if firms make use of long-term
debt: average (taxation / total
assets) per country of firms fi-
nanced without long-term debt
— average (taxation / total
assets) per country of debt-
financed firms; zero otherwise
computed from
ORBIS data
Inflation annual percentage change in
consumer prices
WDI44, World
Bank
43We define and compute the factors used in the empirical investigation according to
common literature. The data for the individual variables is drawn from the respective
sources. All financial data is in thousand EUR.
44World Development Indicators
42
Macroeconomic Factors (cont’d)
GDP Growth annual percentage change in
GDP
WDI, World
Bank
Capital Flows net capital account / GDP WDI, World
Bank
Unemployment total unemployment as percent-
age of total labor force
WDI, World
Bank
Stock Prices annual percentage change in
Standard & Poor’s Global Eq-
uity Indices
WDI, World
Bank
Table A2: Data along different Dimensions
Dimensions Observations
Full Sample 6,365,842
EU27† 5,744,127
Euro Area‡ 4,859,829
Industries
Manufacturing 1,484,855
Electricity, gas and water supply 117,474
Construction and real estate 1,418,791
Wholesale trade 1,375,798
Retail trade 563,192
Transportation and storage 321,420
Accommodation and food 225,965
ICT and research 219,725
Professional and administrative services 638,622
Countries∗
Germany 298,347
United Kingdom 212,695
France 1,321,317
Italy 1,452,641
Spain 1,018,082
Poland 94,890
USA 29,556
Japan 25,738
Legal Status
public 1,016,853
private 4,484,963
n.a. 864,026
∗ includes only eight major countries; † excludes Croatia;
‡ includes Monaco and Montenegro, excludes Latvia
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Table A5: Sample Selection for Long-term and Short-term
Leverage Ratios
full sample lt debt > 0 full sample st debt > 0
Variables Long-term Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage Short-term Leverage
Firm Size 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.031*** -0.062*** -0.128*** -0.128***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.075*** 0.103*** -0.103*** -0.103***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.005*** -0.003** -0.075*** -0.075***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lt Ind. LR -0.023*** -0.094***
(0.008) (0.013)
St Ind. LR 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.007) (0.007)
Ind. Growth -0.023*** -0.025*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.532*** 1.504*** -0.423*** -0.421***
(0.021) (0.088) (0.025) (0.025)
Inflation -0.000*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows -0.258*** -0.209*** 0.482*** 0.465***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.039) (0.039)
Unemployment -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 1,794,355 3,265,810 3,263,935
Number of firms 887,514 596,868 887,514 887,197
R-squared 0.211 0.136 0.203 0.204
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. In
all regressions, I include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. All columns
incorporate the baseline model specification introduced in Section 4.2. Columns 2 and 4 include the same regressions as
in Table 2 for long-term and short-term leverage ratios, respectively. Columns 1 and 3 include regressions for long-term
and short-term leverage ratios, respectively, with the full sample. Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional
clustering of robust standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6: Baseline Results for Leverage Differences
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Total Difference Long-term Difference Short-term Difference
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.158*** -0.064*** -0.158***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.026*** 0.103*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.080*** -0.002 -0.080***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ind. Growth 0.002 -0.031*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.082*** 1.674*** 1.098***
(0.020) (0.088) (0.020)
Inflation 0.001*** -0.000* 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.147*** -0.210*** 0.129***
(0.033) (0.044) (0.033)
Unemployment -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 1,794,355 3,263,935
Number of firms 887,514 596,868 887,197
R-squared 0.097 0.102 0.182
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. All variables are ratios,
growth rates or logarithms. In all regressions, I include firm and year fixed effects and a
constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. All columns incorporate the baseline
model specification introduced in Section 4.2. The dependent variables are differences of
firms’ total leverage from total industry median leverage in column 1, differences of firms’
long-term leverage from long-term industry median leverage in column 2, and differences
of firms’ short-term leverage from short-term industry median leverage. Following Petersen
(2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at firm-level and
year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7: Comparison of Empirical Capital Structure Models
our model Rajan/ Faulkender/ Frank/ Ko¨ksal et
Zingales (1995) Petersen (2006) Goyal (2009) al. (2013)
Variables Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.0008*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.159*** -0.179*** -0.165*** -0.166*** -0.157***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.028*** -0.006*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.078***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.144*** 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.159***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Ind. Growth 0.008***
(0.002)
Tax Shield 1.097*** 1.140*** 1.169*** 1.083***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Inflation 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.226*** 0.476***
(0.000) (0.032)
Unemployment -0.002***
(0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 3,265,810 3,265,810 3,265,810 3,265,810
Number of firms 887,514 887,514 887,514 887,514 887,514
R-squared 0.099 0.072 0.082 0.084 0.087
Notes: See Table A1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. All variables are ratios, growth rates or
logarithms. In all regressions, I include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients
in the tables. Column 1 incorporates the baseline model specification introduced in Section 4.2 for total leverage
ratios. Columns 2 includes Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) model. Originally, they run a cross-sectional study on G7
countries in 1991. Column 3 includes Faulkender and Petersen’s (2006) model. In their study, they analyze US
firms from 1986 to 2000. Column 4 includes Frank and Goyal’s (2009) model specification based on an analysis of
public US firms from 1950 to 2003. Column 5 includes the model by Ko¨ksal et al. (2013). They originally analyze
Turkish firms from 1996 to 2009. In order to compare the different model specifications, we use the same sample for
all regressions based on our model specification from Section 4.2 and the data set explained in Section 3. Following
Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at firm-level and year-level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A1a: Firm Size across Countries
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Figure A1b: Firm Size across Industries
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Figure A2a: Growth Rates across Countries
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Figure A2b: Growth Rates across Industries
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
M
ed
ia
n 
G
ro
wt
h 
Ra
te
s 
pe
r I
nd
us
try
Ma
nu
fac
tur
ing
Ele
ctr
icit
y, 
ga
s a
nd
 wa
ter
 su
pp
ly
Co
nst
ruc
tion
 an
d r
ea
l es
tat
e
Wh
ole
sa
le 
tra
de
Re
tai
l tr
ad
e
Tra
ns
po
rta
tio
n a
nd
 st
ora
ge
Ac
co
mm
od
ati
on
 an
d f
oo
d
ICT
 an
d r
ese
arc
h
Pro
f. a
nd
 ad
m.
 se
rvi
ce
s
Figure A3a: Profitability across Countries
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Figure A3b: Profitability across Industries
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Figure A4a: Tangibility across Countries
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Figure A4b: Tangibility across Industries
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